This article presents a seven-step corpus-based approach to discourse analysis that starts with a detailed analysis of each individual text in a corpus that can then be generalized across all texts of a corpus, providing a description of typical patterns of discourse organization that hold for the entire corpus. This approach is applied specifically to a methodology that is used to analyze texts in terms of the functional/communicative structures that typically make up texts in a genre: move analysis. The resulting (...) corpus-based approach for conducting a move analysis significantly enhances the value of this often used methodology, while at the same time providing badly needed guidelines for a methodology that lacks them. A corpus of ‘birthmother letters’ is used to illustrate the approach. (shrink)

RECENT attempts to explain and justify Aristotle's principle of non-contradiction have focused to a great extent on the dialectical dimension of Aristotle's account. For example, T. Irwin maintains that Aristotle justifies the PNC by arguing that there is a sub-set of dialectical opinions which no one can rationally give up. J. Lear supports the importance of the dialectical dimension by summarizing Aristotle's defense of the PNC as follows: The opponent of the PNC tries to argue dialectically that one should not (...) accept it. "Aristotle's point is that there is no conceptual space in which such a rational discussion can occur." By appealing to the limits of rationally, externally, expressible discourse as the basis of the PNC, Irwin and Lear fail to take seriously the more explicitly psychological and metaphysical bases of the PNC. C. Kirwan, and most recently, R. Smith also either argue against or ignore the role of the psychological and metaphysical bases. Smith goes so far as to argue that common axioms like the PNC are simply empty statement schemata of universal validity, i.e., general verbal forms or patterns which no one can deny with intelligibility. (shrink)

AT POSTERIOR ANALYTICS 1.1.71B15 AND FOLLOWING, Aristotle identifies six characteristics of the first principles from which demonstrative science proceeds. These are traditionally grouped into two sets of three: group A: ex alêthôn, prôtôn, amêsôn; group B: gnôrimôterôn, proterôn, and aitiôn. The characteristic, which I believe has been underrated and somewhat misinterpreted by scholars and commentators from Philoponus to the present day, is the characteristic of truth. In this paper I propose to present a textually based interpretation of truth that shows (...) the following: that truth is necessarily linked to being. The example given of nonbeing, the commensurability of the diagonal with the sides of a square, suggests more than simple truth is required for first principles and premises of demonstrative science; and that Aristotle later in the APo changes this characteristic to necessary truth, for he recognizes that truth alone is an insufficient basis for scientific demonstration. The referents of necessary truth are eternal being, and the need for eternal being demands that universals exist extramentally for Aristotle. Finally, one of the important ways that universal genera and species exist for Aristotle are as real, causal principles. (shrink)

In this paper I present an interpretation of a phrase used throughout Aristotle’s Metaphysics: “man begets man.” Basing my interpretation on Aristotle’s account of the generation of animals in general and of monsters (terata) in particular, I argue that the universal genus and the universal species have causal roles to play in the generation of animals. Because the movements in the male sperm of the universal species and the universal genus (though the species and genus do not exist separately) are (...) real, and are actual, not potential, movements, I maintain that the roles of these universals normally precede the further particularization of the developing embryo by the movements in the sperm of the particular father. I show that the roles of the movements of the genus and species are most clear in the case of the generation of monsters. I believe that the often neglected topic of the generation of monsters has important implications for Aristotle’s view of metaphysics and scientific demonstration. (shrink)

The central thesis of this book, which is defended well, is that only a normative theory of rationality can deal adequately with the subject of the nature of rationality. According to the author, "Good reasons for believing, for evaluating, and for acting go together to make up a seamless and indivisible whole". In light of his central thesis and the scope of this book, which includes an investigation of the mechanics, justification, and rewards of reason, Rescher argues that social scientists (...) who try to present a theory of rationality and at the same time avoid the rationality of normative judgments "[are] condemned from the very outset to an inappropriate view of the rational enterprise". (shrink)

A good work in philosophy should, it seems, have two essential characteristics: broad philosophical vision and careful, convincing argumentation. This book has both. Guiding the work is Gill's refreshingly original vision of Aristotle's cosmos. Instead of the austere traditional view of this cosmos in which God as pure form and actuality is at the top, and prime matter as pure matter and potentiality is at the bottom, with composite bodies in between the two, Gill proposes another view. In Aristotle's cosmos (...) God as pure form and actuality is indeed at the top, but at the bottom is not matter as indeterminate potentiality, but as a set of simple elements. These elements have definite natures, but are not composites of matter and form. Because these elements have definite natures, they are not just static building blocks of the composite substances into which they are formed. Rather, material, composite substances, held together by form, tend to be subverted by the very matter of which they are composed. Thus, on Gill's view, "The Aristotelian cosmos is a world of tension and commotion-ordered and preserved by form, disordered by matter". (shrink)

This book is a revised version of Morrison’s doctoral thesis. Unlike many revised theses, however, this book is very readable and clearly presented. Against the common, predominately negative view of Aristotle’s notion of place, this book takes a positive approach to place and has as its explicit aim to set out clearly Aristotle’s account of place in Physics 4.1–5 in such a way as to revive it as a piece of genuinely important philosophy. The author’s refreshingly positive approach to this (...) much-maligned topic in Aristotle serves to sustain the reader’s interest in the author’s interpretation of the sometimes complex and perplexing texts of Physics 4. (shrink)

This special supplementary volume of Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy contains the revised versions of papers which were first presented at a colloquium on ancient philosophy held at Oberlin College in 1986. In addition to the five major papers presented at the colloquium, the replies of the five commentators as well as the responses of the authors to the commentators are contained in this volume. In some cases, such as the reply of David Charles, the replies are almost papers in (...) their own right, while in others, the replies are restricted to comments on the major paper. Although there is no theme common to all the papers, the topics of which range from Plato's theory of perception to Aristotle's account of political distribution--and so the volume suffers from a certain lack of unity--the general high quality of the papers and the replies more than makes up for this lack of unity. (shrink)

In this collection of essays, which is Volume 19 in the University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, Laudan examines, in a very engaging manner, the fortunes of the method of hypothesis in the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries. Most of the essays have appeared elsewhere, but some are published here for the first time. Although there is no introductory or concluding essay that attempts to tie all of the articles together, this collection still succeeds in presenting itself (...) as a unified examination of the important topic of the method of hypothesis. Laudan's expressed intent is to "identify some of the recurrent themes associated with debates about the method of hypothesis and to examine some of the specific causes for its changing fortunes". He does more in this collection than merely fulfill his rather modest intent. In each of his essays, Laudan succeeds in presenting both a clear statement of his particular theme and also a concise and often convincing argument for his particular interpretation of each theme concerning the history of the method of hypothesis. (shrink)

Contrary to what its title may seem to imply, this intriguing study is best appreciated as a study in scientific realism. As Rom Harré notes in the preface, "science only makes sense as a realist enterprise, an attempt, using the means at hand, to truly represent physical reality as it is.... Indeed this very study is a realist enterprise, an attempt to truly represent the social order of life in laboratories and institutes of research, just as they are". When viewed (...) as an exercise in scientific realism, Knorr-Cetina's work is most accurately summarized as an attempt to analyze the work of science in terms of the often overlooked human interests and endeavors that interweave to form the real world context out of which the results of scientific research emerge and have meaning. (shrink)

This title was first published in 2002. This book builds on contemporary discussion of 'mysticism' and religious experience by examining the process and content of 'religious knowing' in classical and modern Advaita. Drawing from the work of William Alston and Alvin Plantinga, Thomas Forsthoefel examines key streams of Advaita with special reference to the conditions, contexts, and scope of epistemic merit in religious experience. Forsthoefel uniquely employs specific analytical categories of contemporary Western epistemologies as heuristics to examine the cognitive (...) dimension of religious experience in Indian Vedanta. Showing the developing nuances in the analysis of religious experience in the thought of Shankara and his immediate disciples (Suresvara and Padmapada) as well as in the teaching of Ramana Maharshi, an understudied but important South Indian saint of the 20th century, this book offers a substantial contribution to studies of Indian philosophy as well as to contemporary philosophy of religion. Using the tools of exegesis and comparative philosophy, Forsthoefel argues for a careful justification of claims following religious experience, even if such claims involve, as they do in the Advaita, a paradoxical 'knowing beyond knowledge'. (shrink)

Fragt man heute Vertreter verschiedener Disziplinen nach der Bedeutung des Hannoveraner Universalgelehrten Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, so hort man jeweils immer wieder: Leibniz hat Bedeutendes fur unser Fach geleistet. Leibniz beeindruckt nicht nur durch die Exzellenz seiner Leistung, sondern auch durch die Breite seiner Betatigungsfelder. Der aus einer Ringvorlesung an der Leibniz Universitat Hannover hervorgegangene Band fuhrt nun an die Vielfalt der von Leibniz ausgehenden der Leistungen und Anregungen heran. Insbesondere behandeln die Beitrage die Bedeutung von Leibniz fur die Geschichtswissenschaft, die (...) Theologie, die Philosophie, die Rechtswissenschaft und Juristerei, die Politikberatung, das Versicherungswesen, die Mathematik, die Ingenieurwissenschaften und die Sprachwissenschaft. Abgerundet wird der Band durch eine Einfuhrung von Werner Eisner und eine biographische Skizze aus der Feder von Eike Christian Hirsch. (shrink)

Metzger continues the effort started in _A Cloud Across the Pacific_ (The Chinese University Press, 2005) by viewing modern Chinese thought as political philosophy; placing it in a sociological context, noting its causal relationship with paideia; examining its historical context by emphasizing the lines of continuity with the Confucian tradition; and exploring its comparative context by describing it as sharing an agenda with and diverging from the leading forms of Western liberalism. East and West, he argues, are ivory towers that (...) use their rationalistic philosophies to insist that the great disasters of history are caused mainly by the bad decisions of political leaders, instead of seeing how their own philosophical discourses lend credibility to these decisions and trying to improve these discourses by uncovering their culturally inherited premises. In an increasingly democratic era when political philosophy is no longer viable as a theory of global-political evolution and as public criticism increasingly affects leadership decisions, Metzger seeks to vindicate a neo-Hegelian definition of political philosophy as the effort to influence public criticism by advertising an outlook more logically and thoroughly supported by a variety of cross-cultural textual evidence. (shrink)

Ancient Greek Philosophy: From the Presocratics to the Hellenistic Philosophers presents a comprehensive introduction to the philosophers and philosophical traditions that developed in ancient Greece from 585 BC to 529 AD. Provides coverage of the Presocratics through the Hellenistic philosophers Moves beyond traditional textbooks that conclude with Aristotle A uniquely balanced organization of exposition, choice excerpts and commentary, informed by classroom feedback Contextual commentary traces the development of lines of thought through the period, ideal for students new to the discipline (...) Can be used in conjunction with the online resources found at http://tomblackson.com/Ancient/toc.html. (shrink)

Examines the relationship between the question of God and the destiny of metaphysics. Concept of the end of metaphysics; Ambiguous relation between phenomenology and metaphysics; Return of special metaphysics in phenomenology; Phenomenological figure of God. Examines the relationship between the question of God and the destiny of metaphysics. Concept of the end of metaphysics; Ambiguous relation between phenomenology and metaphysics; Return of special metaphysics in phenomenology; Phenomenological figure of God.

Non-epistemic values play important roles in classificatory practice, such that philosophical accounts of kinds and classification should be able to accommodate them. Available accounts fail to do so, however. Our aim is to fill this lacuna by showing how non-epistemic values feature in scientific classification, and how they can be incorporated into a philosophical theory of classification and kinds. To achieve this, we present a novel account of kinds and classification, discuss examples from biological classification where non-epistemic values play decisive (...) roles, and show how this account accommodates the role of non-epistemic values. (shrink)

In Plato’s Protagoras, Socrates argues that ‘the many’ are confused about the experience they describe as ‘being overcome by pleasure’. They think the cause is ‘something other than ignorance’. He argues it follows from what they believe that the cause is ‘ignorance’ and ‘false belief’. I show that his argument depends on a premise he does not introduce but they should deny: that when someone is overcome by pleasure, the desire stems from a belief. To explain why Plato does not (...) make Socrates introduce this premise, the account I construct is speculative. It starts from the assumption that Plato is thinking through an understanding of human beings and what they must do to live good lives that he takes the historical Socrates to set out. (shrink)

Natural kinds are often contrasted with other kinds of scientific kinds, especially functional kinds, because of a presumed categorical difference in explanatory value: supposedly, natural kinds can ground explanations, while other kinds of kinds cannot. I argue against this view of natural kinds by examining a particular type of explanation—mechanistic explanation—and showing that functional kinds do the same work there as traditionally recognized natural kinds are supposed to do in “standard” scientific explanations. Breaking down this categorical distinction between traditional natural (...) kinds and other kinds of kinds, I argue, delivers two goods: It provides us with a view of natural kindhood that does justice to the epistemic roles of kinds in scientific explanations. And it allows us to solve a problem that HPC theory, currently one of the more popular accounts of natural kindhood, confronts. (shrink)

Keith DeRose gives an invalid argument for contextualism in “Assertion, Knowledge, and Context.” In section 2.4, entitled “The Argument for Contextualism,” DeRose makes the following remarks. “The knowledge account of assertion provides a powerful argument for contextualism: If the standards for when one is in a position to warrantedly assert that P are the same as those that comprise a truth-condition for ‘I know P,’ then if the former vary with context, so do the latter. In short: The knowledge account (...) of assertion together with the context-sensitivity of assertability yields contextualism about knowledge”. (shrink)

Natural kinds are often contrasted with other kinds of scientific kinds, especially functional kinds, because of a presumed categorical difference in explanatory value: supposedly, natural kinds can ground explanations, while other kinds of kinds cannot. I argue against this view of natural kinds by examining a particular type of explanation—mechanistic explanation—and showing that functional kinds do the same work there as traditionally recognized natural kinds are supposed to do in “standard” scientific explanations. Breaking down this categorical distinction between traditional natural (...) kinds and other kinds of kinds, I argue, delivers two goods: It provides us with a view of natural kindhood that does justice to the epistemic roles of kinds in scientific explanations. And it allows us to solve a problem that HPC theory, currently one of the more popular accounts of natural kindhood, confronts. (shrink)

The Genesis of God: A Theological Genealogy. By Thomas J.J. Altizer. Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993. pp.200.

Business schools play an instrumental role in laying the foundations for ethical behavior and socially responsible actions in the business community. Drawing on social learning and identity theories and using data collected from undergraduate business students, we found that ethical climate was a significant predictor of unethical behavior, such that students with positive perceptions about their business school’s ethical climate were more likely to refrain from unethical behaviors. Moreover, we found that high moral and institutional identities strengthened the effect of (...) ethical climate on unethical behavior. In addition to novel theoretical contributions to the business ethics and socio-psychology literature, this study offers practical pathways through which business schools can nurture and instill the values and behaviors that ultimately help shape positive organizational ethics. Directions for future research are provided. (shrink)

In Plato’s Gorgias, Socrates says to Callicles that “your love of the people, existing in your soul, stands against me, but if we closely examine these same matters often and in a better way, you will be persuaded” (513c7–d1). I argue for an interpretation that explains how Socrates understands Callicles’s love of the people to stand against him and why he believes examination often and in a better way will persuade Callicles.

Keith DeRose gives an invalid argument for contextualism in “Assertion, Knowledge, and Context.” In section 2.4, entitled “The Argument for Contextualism,” DeRose makes the following remarks. “The knowledge account of assertion provides a powerful argument for contextualism: If the standards for when one is in a position to warrantedly assert that P are the same as those that comprise a truth-condition for ‘I know P,’ then if the former vary with context, so do the latter. In short: The knowledge account (...) of assertion together with the context-sensitivity of assertability yields contextualism about knowledge”. (shrink)

While evolutionary thinking is increasingly becoming popular in fields of investigation outside the biological sciences, it remains unclear how helpful it is there and whether it actually yields good explanations of the phenomena under study. Here we examine the ontology of a recent approach to applying evolutionary thinking outside biology, the generalized Darwinism approach proposed by Geoffrey Hodgson and Thorbjørn Knudsen. We examine the ontology of populations in biology and in GD, and argue that biological evolutionary theory sets ontological criteria (...) that GD fails to meet. We suggest two options to revise the population concept in GD: reformulating the concept in terms of inheritance and reproduction such that it comes to pick out individuals similar to evolving populations, or trying to build an adequate population concept on a principle of differential retention instead of differential reproduction. 1 Introduction2 Generalized Darwinism2.1 What is generalized Darwinism?2.2 Darwinian principles3 The Ontology of Generalized Darwinism: What Are Populations?3.1 The population concept of generalized Darwinism3.2 The population concept in evolutionary theory4 Locating Evolving Systems in Generalized Darwinism5 Conclusion. (shrink)

BackgroundDespite rapid growth of the scientific literature, no consensus guidelines have emerged to define the optimal criteria for editors to grade submitted manuscripts. The purpose of this project was to assess the peer reviewer metrics currently used in the surgical literature to evaluate original manuscript submissions.MethodsManuscript grading forms for 14 of the highest circulation general surgery-related journals were evaluated for content, including the type and number of quantitative and qualitative questions asked of peer reviewers. Reviewer grading forms for the seven (...) surgical journals with the higher impact factors were compared to the seven surgical journals with lower impact factors using Fisher’s exact tests.ResultsImpact factors of the studied journals ranged from 1.73 to 8.57, with a median impact factor of 4.26 in the higher group and 2.81 in the lower group. The content of the grading forms was found to vary considerably. Relatively few journals asked reviewers to grade specific components of a manuscript. Higher impact factor journal manuscript grading forms more frequently addressed statistical analysis, ethical considerations, and conflict of interest. In contrast, lower impact factor journals more commonly requested reviewers to make qualitative assessments of novelty/originality, scientific validity, and scientific importance.ConclusionSubstantial variation exists in the grading criteria used to evaluate original manuscripts submitted to the surgical literature for peer review, with differential emphasis placed on certain criteria correlated to journal impact factors. (shrink)

Organizational ecology is commonly seen as a Darwinian research program that seeks to explain the diversity of organizational structures, properties and behaviors as the product of selection in past social environments in a similar manner as evolutionary biology seeks to explain the forms, properties and behaviors of organisms as consequences of selection in past natural environments. We argue that this explanatory strategy does not succeed because organizational ecology theory lacks an evolutionary mechanism that could be identified as the principal cause (...) of organizational diversity. The “evolution” of organizational populations by means of selection, which organizational ecologists put forward as the mechanism responsible for the extant diversity of organizational forms, is not evolution in any proper sense, because organizational populations do not have what it takes to participate in evolutionary processes. This implies that organizational ecology is not a Darwinian research program and that it cannot explain organizational diversity. (shrink)

Species in biology are traditionally perceived as kinds of organisms about which explanatory and predictive generalizations can be made, and biologists commonly use species in this manner. This perception of species is, however, in stark contrast with the currently accepted view that species are not kinds or classes at all, but individuals. In this paper I investigate the conditions under which the two views of species might be held simultaneously. Specifically, I ask whether upon acceptance of an ontology of species (...) as diachronic segments of the tree of life species can perform the epistemic role of kinds of organisms to which explanatory and predictive generalizations apply. I show that, for species-level segments of the tree of life, several requirements have to be met before the performance of this epistemic role is possible, and I argue that these requirements can be met by defining species according to the Composite Species Concept proposed by Kornet and McAllister in the 1990s. (shrink)

Beginning with a Cuban Catholic ritual in Miami, this book takes readers on a momentous theoretical journey toward a new understanding of religion.

Early last year, the GenEthics Consortium (GEC) of the Washington Metropolitan Area convened at George Washington University to consider a complex case about genetic testing for Alzheimer disease (AD). The GEC consists of scientists, bioethicists, lawyers, genetic counselors, and consumers from a variety of institutions and affiliations. Four of the 8 co-authors of this paper delivered presentations on the case. Supplemented by additional ethical and legal observations, these presentations form the basis for the following discussion.

There is an interesting parallel between two debates in different domains of contemporary analytic philosophy. One is the endurantism– perdurantism, or three-dimensionalism vs. four-dimensionalism, debate in analytic metaphysics. The other is the debate on the species problem in philosophy of biology. In this paper I attempt to cross-fertilize these debates with the aim of exploiting some of the potential that the two debates have to advance each other. I address two issues. First, I explore what the case of species implies (...) regarding the feasibility of particular positions in the endurantism– perdurantism debate. I argue that the case of species casts doubt on the recent claim that three-dimensionalism and four-dimensionalism are equivalent descriptions of the same underlying reality. Second, and conversely, I examine whether the metaphysical worry about three-dimensionalism and four-dimensionalism can help us to better understand the nature of biological species. I show that analyzing the thesis that species are individuals against the background of the endurantism– perdurantism debate allows us to explicate two different ways in which this thesis can be interpreted. (shrink)